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Courting Public Opinion
A lot of what happens before the bench depends on what has appeared on television
and in the newspapers. To avoid being indicted early by the "public jury," you
need to consid_er how the press can help, and hurt, your case
ROSS SANDLER

E

NVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
has as much to do with the media as
it does with the law. Public health
and ecology issues arise in even the
smallest environmental controversy, making litigation of even modest consequences
newsworthy. And when the press gets interested in a case, strange things happen. A
lawyer's careful briefs and oral arguments
may be completely undone by a client's media moves. Or vice versa. A case with little
chance of success on the merits may become
threatening and powerful simply because of
press interest.
The power of the media has not gone un10 • THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM

noticed by environmental litigants. Plaintiffs in environmental cases use pleadings
like press releases. They play to a higher
court-the court of public opinion-while
defendants, often mistakenly advised by
their attorneys to be mum, hope the bad
news will only be a one-day story. But that
rarely happens. As a result, press strategy
inevitably becomes an integral part of litigation strategy.
The simple act of filing a complaint in an
environmental lawsuit is a newsworthy
event. It is the opening shot, the starting gun,
the kickoff. Consequently, the plaintiff controls press timing and content. It is the plain-

tiff's m om ent in the sun becau se it ha s the
chance to tell its story in the_m ost favorable
light. Prosecutors, attorneys genera l, agency
head s, and citizen groups all capitalize on
this fa ct. They write complaints as source
m aterial for press releases; indeed, if an allegation appears in the complaint, it becom es
part of the formal public record and can be
rep eated for the press.
For example, w hen Alaska n plaintiffs, including the Yupik Eskimo Community, su ed
to halt a 1983 Department of Interi or offshore lease for oil and gas explorati on in the
Norton Sound Basin, they supported their
claim of standing with an extended description of their u se of the Ala skan wa ters. They
alleged that the w atery area of the lease sale
is "the biological supermarket and spiritual
cathedral of the Yupik p eople of Alaska."
The complaint continued tha t " in recent
times the d ominant society in the United
States has intruded into Yupik society and
community life to an ex tent never before
experienced . In the face of tempting economic prizes (jobs, cash, security), the Yupik
Eskimo people h as d etermined to stea dfa stly withstand these temptations and rea ffirm a commitment to their Way of Life and
tribal relationship." Such allega tions are no t
for the d efendants; after all, they wou Id have
little basis on which to affirm o r d eny them.
Rather, they are m eant to be powerful read ing for the press and the public.
LlHOUGHFILING A COMPLAINT
often creates news, the dismissal of
a complaint is almost never newsworthy. Vindica tion is a lonely business; there is littl e chance that an yone w ill
h ear about a complaint being thrown out of
court. Moreover, all intermedia te discovery,
brief writing, and mo tion practice might as
well happen on another planet. Unless a
lawyer commands a ttentio n in the manner
of Alan Dershow itz, his or her intrica te argum ents and briefs w ill never rise to public
notice.
If the d efendant w ants to get its side before the public, it need s to be in the first
article that reports the complaint. There are
rarely follow-up stories. If the d efendant announces "no comment" or "we' re studying
the complaint," it will probably never get a
second chance. People believe the worst,
and limp responses confirm guilt. Typica lly,
defendants will be relegated to the last paragraphs w hile the plaintiff's story w ill be repeated in d etail. But tw o years later w hen
the victo ry is the defendant's, no one w ill
know.
Most environmental d efendants d o not
win dismissals, esp ecially aga inst governmental plaintiffs. But, since the d efendant is
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genera lly awa re of a n investiga tio n before
the complaint is fil ed , it has a number of
options in d ealing w ith th e press in order to
make the best of a p oor h and.
Fo r exa mpl e, on Jul y 11, 1991, A lcoa
agreed to p ay $3.75 million in criminal fin es
a nd $3.75 million in civil p enalties fo r hazard ou s waste viola tions a t its Massena, New
York, facility. The criminal fine was the largest ever pa id fo r a hazardou s waste violatio n . N ew York A tto rney Gen era l Robert
Abram s, the N ew York Depa rtment of Environmenta l Conserva tion, and Alcoa each issued sep ara te press releases.
Abram s, pursuing a tough law en forcem ent image, detai led the viola tio ns a nd emphasized the record size of the p enalty. The
attorney genera l stated tha t "Alcoa illega lly
kept quantiti es of hazard ou s waste a t the
site, prepared fa lse d ocuments to concea l
w hat it was transporting, fa iled to obtai n
required state permits, and dumped hazard ou s solutions into th e environment. " In fac t,
Alcoa shipped 33 railroad cars of PCB-contaminated soil to Alabama, and admitted to
dumping hazardou s wastes down a manhole approxima tely 2,000 times since 1985.
Moreover, two Alcoa employees pl ead ed
g uilty to criminal charges and paid fi nes.
Th e sa m e day, Alcoa issu ed its own sta tement, w hich is a mod el of how a corpora tion
can ta ke ch arge of a disastrou s situa tion . The
s ta tem ent, w hi ch A lcoa attributed to its
chairma n, Paul H . O'Neill, rea d : "Alcoa has
a clear environmental policy w hi ch was no t
followed in this instance. The manager of the
Alcoa plant at Massena first identifi ed the
viola tions tha t formed the basis fo r this settlem ent and bro ught them to the attention of
New York Sta te offi cials. Since th e problem s
were identifi ed , Alcoa has full y coopera ted
w ith the Depa rtment of Environmental Conserva tion and the a ttorney genera l and has
entered into this agreem ent beca u se it was
clea r that employees of the company had, in
fac t, viola ted th e law and company policy.
Under the law, the com pa ny is responsible
for w rongful acts by its employees. Alcoa
has accepted this resp onsibility. With th is
unfo rtunate episod e behind us, we ca n now
turn our full attention to m eeting our environmental obliga tions ."
The Depa rtment of Environmenta l Conserva ti on issu ed its sepa ra te press release
w hich read as if Alcoa had won its Environm enta list of the Yea r Awa rd. The initia l
quote in the DEC press release, attributed to
Commissioner Thomas Jorling, read , "Alcoa's fo rthrig htness a nd commitment to
bring the Massena plant into fu ll com pliance
w ith New York's environmental laws u nd erscores ou r belief tha t en vironmen tal protection and manufac turing activity are full y
compa tib le." Emphasizing Alcoa's agree-
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ment to install new water pollution abatement equipment, Jorling stated, 'We are
pleased to have a corporation with such responsible environmental management operating in New York." As if this were not
enough, the press release lauded O'Neill for
reporting the violations to the state-an act
which, coupled with the guilty plea and consent order, convinced DEC that Alcoa
"would be a good corporate environmental
citizen in New York."
Then the Wall Street Journal carried the
story. It headlined "Alcoa to pay $7.5 million
of hazardous waste violations," described
the charges and the settlement, but quoted
only one person in the story: Alcoa's Chairman O'Neill. The Journal reported that he
had taken responsibility and had declared
that the matter was behind the company.
Although in this case the defendant's press
strategy did not yield a court victory, it certainly proved to be face-saving.
ONTROVERSY OVER DEVELOPment projects usually begins with
an administrative action, not court
action. The battle lines form early,
often during a public debate before a local
zoning board, the EPA, the Army Corps of
Engineers, or a similar agency, or in hearings
or written comments that may themselves
attract media attention. The winner is the
one who succeeds in tacking a pejorative
label on the other: NIMBYs on one side,
rapacious developer on the other. Even if the
opponents can simply cause the project to be
judged "controversial," they are well on
their way to success.
Getting the press to treat a project as controversial is tantamount to overcoming the
legal harmless error rule: only errors that
significantly hurt the appellant's case warrant reversal. Similarly, if the project is
deemed controversial, then litigation about
it becomes significant, and legal or procedural errors are no longer harmless. Judges
pay closer attention and, right or wrong,
plaintiffs become worthier of a remedy. Conversely, if a project is not controversial, the
judge will care less about the plaintiff's
claims. Although plaintiffs do not always
succeed in this strategy, their odds are improved if the media have already taken their
cause seriously.
On the other hand, once a project gets
labeled as controversial, there is almost no
power on earth that can alter that image. The
project passes into that special territory occupied by such favorites as the Cross Florida
Barge Canal, the Alaska Pipeline, the Tellico
Dam, Westway, Mono Lake, the North Slope,
nuclear power, and hazardous waste disposal sites. The battle lines become fixed like
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ancient tribal boundaries, and it does not
matter what particular issue establishes the
project as controversial. Spotted owls, snail
darters, striped bass, caribou, whales, rain
forests, and redwoods all possess intrinsic
ecological importance and are worth fighting for on the merits. But for litigation, their
special importance lies in the power to convert an ordinary proposal into a controversial
proposal.
The very first modern environmental lawsuit showed the .way. Consolidated Edison,
New York City's electricity supplier, proposed in September 1962 to build a pumped
storage hydroelectric plant at Storm King
Mountain in the Hudson Highlands south of
Newburgh. It would have been the third
largest hydroelectric plant in the United
States.
The opponents, mostly nearby homeowners, organized. Their first goal was to establish that they were not just against development, but were fighting for an equal and
perhaps more important value. Calling
themselves the Scenic Hudson Preservation
Council, they emphasized the aesthetic
splendor of the Hudson Highlands and their
role as the inspiration for the Hudson River
school of painting, America's most important contribution to nineteenth century art.
They dramatized the highlands' unique history by organizing a water-borne protest in
which small boats paraded as a regatta past
Storm King Mountain. The fleet sailed
through the historic and scenic water gap,
and right into the New York Times and other
national news magazines, which reported in
picture and story the plucky fight to halt the
loss of scenic beauty. In one stroke, the opponents raised the recreational and scenic
resource issue to a level equal to that of the
region's need for electricity. Consolidated
Edison's proposal had become controversial.
In 1965, the Second Circuit Court reversed
the Federal Power Commission's grant of
the license, opening its decision with a favorable nod to Scenic Hudson's press campaign: "The Storm King project is to be located in an area of unique beauty and major
historical significance. The highlands and
gorge of the Hudson offer one of the finest
pieces of river scenery in the world. The
great German traveler Baedeker called it
'finer than the Rhine.'"
From that aesthetic foundation, the court
held that "recreational purposes . .. undoubtedly encompass the conservation of
natural resources, the maintenance of natural beauty, and the preservation of historic
sites." Having made that leap, which heretofore had not been at all obvious, the court
chastised the FPC for not affirmatively protecting the recreational rights of the public
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when it failed to analyze alternatives to the
project, such as gas turbines and interconnections with other utilities. In short, the
Scenic Hudson Preservation Council had
played the press card exactly right. ·
The best press efforts persuade through a
visually compelling dramatization. A stunning example of this strategy occurred in
New York City in 1987, when the Municipal
Art Society and others sued to stop construction of a city-sponsored three million square
foot office and residential building at Columbus Circle, on the southwestern edge of
Central Park. The developer planned two
huge towers, one 925 feet high and the second 802 feet high. In addition to alleging
technical violations in the request for proposals and in the contract, the plaintiffs objected primarily to the project's overwhelming size, which would cause street congestion and block sunlight from reaching Central Park. At first, few observers gave them
much of a chance for success. But then the
opponents demonstrated.
The Municipal Art Society invited supporters to gather in Central Park one Sunday
at noon to "Stand Against The Shadow." The
invitation said "Bring A Black Umbrella,
Rain Or Shine." After a rally, the opponents
intended to form a line the length of the
shadow cast by the building. "Starting at
Columbus Circle," the press release promised, "participants one after the other will
open their umbrellas, causing a 'wave' of
black umbrellas that will reach Fifth Avenue
and 69th Street. Almost a mile long, the
shadow that will be created is one that
would be cast over the Park on March 21 (the
first day of spring) and September 21 (the
last day of summer) at 5:00 p.rn. The actual
shadow will go far beyond the park to Second Avenue."
That Sunday proved brilliantly sunny, and
a thousand opponents of the project turned
out. The umbrellas unfurled as planned and
the press loved it. It didn't hurt that Jackie
Onassis and Bill Moyers assumed leadership of the protest. The Daily News headlined
the next day "Shadowy Protest Held." The
Wall Street Journal printed a long analysis
headed "Building That Would Shade Central Park Draws Quiet Civic Group Into the
Light." The West Side Spirit declared it was
"Celebs Vs. The Shadow." Kent Barwick, the
president of the Municipal Art Society,
summed up the case: "It was necessary to
assemble today to protest man's basic right
to sunlight and air. When you attack Central
Park, you do so at your own great peril."
Two months later, the court ruled in favor
of the opponents, finding that the request for
proposal and contract had been defective, as
the plaintiffs alleged. The Shadow was not
mentioned. The city settled the case with the

Municipal Art Society by lopping 175 feet off
the building. But, proving again the rule that
once a project is controversial, it is always
controversial, another lawsuit surfaced
charging the city with a violation of the New
York City Clean Air Act plan. That case also
proved successful. Together, the lawsuits,
along with a general office glut, have kept
the developer from breaking ground, and
Central Park remains free of The Shadow.
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FA PARTY TO AN ENVIRONMENTAL
conflict has to buy an advertisement to
sell its proposal, then it's probably too
late: the project has most likely already
entered the pantheon of world-class controversial projects. One of the latest inductees
is Hydro-Quebec's proposal to spend $11.7
billion to build a series of hydroelectric dams
and reservoirs on the Great Whale River,
which flows into Hudson Bay. Because Hydro-Quebec intends to sell a portion of the
power to users in New York and Vermont,
the project has become international.
After a series of adverse news stories, the
controversy erupted with full-page ads in
the New York Times. On October 21, 1991,
opponents of the project headed their ad
"CATASTROPHE AT JAMES BAY: Destroying A Wilderness The Size Of France." With
pictures of drowned caribou and a young
Cree Indian, the ad summarized its opposition by declaring the project an "ecological
catastrophe on a scale with the devastation
of the Amazon."
Three days later, Hydro-Quebec responded with its own full-page ad, which it
headed "Looking At Facts Rather Than Symbols." Hydro-Quebec said, "Let's Talk Sensibly," pictured live caribou running across a
frozen reservoir, and showed Crees apparently happily living side by side with "traditional and modern economics."
But Hydro-Quebec has been on therunfor ·
some time, in large part because of the low
cost of competing fuels, but also due to the
articulate advocacy of Matthew Coon Come,
the grand chief of the Quebec Crees, who has
traveled extensively in the United States.
Three weeks before the battle of the ads,
Coon Corne declared before a New York legislative hearing that hydroelectric projects
already in operation were "eating away at
the soul of my people . . .. The Cree have
constructed no great earth works and built
no pyramids, but our grandfathers always
managed to leave the land as it had been, a
remarkable achievement."
With the controversy established, the
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation announced that for the
first time it would require a full environmental impact statement on alternatives to

I
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the purchase of Hydro-Quebec's power. The
press campaign therefore succeeded not
only in labeling the project as controversial,
but also in erecting an administrative and
legal hurdle that previously had not existed.
Environmental law possesses a moral
force which defendants defy at their peril.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William
Sound in March 1989, and the subsequent
litigation, has been a textbook of lessons in
this regard. In April 1991, after months of
negotiations, the federal government and
Exxon announced a $1.1 billion settlement of
all federal civil and criminal litigation. Unfortunately, the settlement-trumpeted as
the biggest ever by Attorney General Richard Thornburgh and EPA Administrator
William Reilly-was immediately undone.
The stories reporting the settlement
quoted a pugnacious and impenitent
Lawrence Rawl, chairman of Exxon, saying
that the penalties would have "no significant effect on our earnings," which he had
announced on the same day to be $2.24 billion for the first quarter of 1991, a 75 percent
increase over the prior year. From the timing, it appeared that the penalties were a
mere slap on the wrist, while Exxon's profit
bonanza in fact resulted from the price increase accompanying the Persian Gulf war.
Rawl's bravado exacerbated the unfavorable reaction among Alaskans and environmentalists who, even before reading Rawl's
comments, had a larger view of what justice
required in the way of both cleanup and
contrition. This reaction ultimately led the
Alaska state legislature and the federal
judge to reject the agreement which had
been so carefully crafted by the lawyers in
the Justice Department.
Six months later, Exxon and the federal
government reached a new settlement
which turned out to be remarkably like the
earlier one. This time the parties had apparently worked out a different role for Rawl.
He showed up in the federal court in Alaska
to plead Exxon guilty to a single misdemeanor for killing migratory waterfowl.
Also present wa s the president of Exxon
Shipping Company, a subsidiary, who
pleaded guilty for his company to three misdemeanors: killing waterfowl, violations of
the Clean Water Act, and violations of the
Refuse Act. In return, the prosecution
dropped four felony and two misdemeanor
counts.
Demonstrating contrition by his court appearance, Rawl went further, saying, in effect, that the fines hurt. He stated that the oil
market was too competitive to pass on the
costs of the fines to consumers, and that
Exxon's shareholders would be the ones to
pay. Ironically, a later economic analysis of
the monetary settlement by the New York

14 • THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM

Times reported that the second settlement
was in fact $5.5 million cheaper for Exxon.
Rawl, when he appeared in the Alaskan
federal court, was clearly uncomfortable in
the role of defendant at the dock. The New
York Times reported that "for the normally
combative Mr. Rawl, his role as humbled oil
company chief was unusual. Answering the
kind of routine questions that judges normally direct at defendants to insure that they
understand their rights, Mr. Rawl spoke in a
barely audible voice."
The environmentalists remained unconvinced that the settlement fully compensated for the damage caused by the spill, and
many continued to oppose the settlement.
This time, however, the agreement held. But
as one relentless environmentalist said at the
time, "At least we got to see Rawl before the
court pleading guilty, mumbling his answers."
MAJOR CRISIS FOCUSES MEDIA
attention immediately, as the Exxon
Valdez accident clearly shows. How
the defendant handles the crisis directly affects subsequent litigation. As images of oil soft! y rolling over beach rocks and
dying birds and sea otters filled the evening
news reports, Rawl failed to issue a comment for a week, and when he did, he
blamed the Coast Guard and Alaska officials
for the slowness of the post-spill cleanup.
During the week of Raw l's silence, the news
media complained of difficulty in getting
accurate information. Exxon's public relations team attempted to brief reporters from
Valdez, which proved too remote and, coupled with the general difficulty in getting
news from the area, caused Exxon to issue
conflicting and late information to reporters.
On the whole, Exxon appeared distant, disengaged, and unresponsive.
A month after the spill, pundits of crisis
mana gement were al ready publishing articles analyzing Exxon's performance, generally grading it as poor. The New York Times,
in a critique of Exxon's actions in the days
following the spill, reported that the company violated six "cardinal rules" of crisis
management. The article singled out for particular criticism Rawl's decision not to go to
Valdez immediately and his unavailability
to the press for a week after the accident.
One crisis management expert stated that,
"As phony as it sounds, send ing the chairman to the scene would have shown genuine concern for what happened there."
Rawl seemed to agree. In an interview in
the Wall Street Journal three months after the
spill, he admitted to waking up in the middle of the night questioning the decision to
stay home. He stated that although his in-
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stinct had been to head fo r Alaska, he was
persuaded not to by a consensus of his fellow Exxon executives. According to Rawl,
they argued that there was nothing for him
to d o since the company was alrea d y d oing
everything that could be done at the scene
and had accepted responsibility. Rawl, his
advisers argued, would just get in th e way
of "p eople w ho were alread y up to their
necks in alliga tors."
But with hindsight, it is clea r tha t the litiga tion ga me began fo r Exxon w ith its first
public statements, before any complaints
were filed . In a crisis of even mod erate magnitud e, the public ex pects th e top person to
take charge and speak for the company.
When the Exxon tanker grounded on the
rocks of Prince William Sound, rea lizing a
potential accident that had been the subject
of a long dispute about the risks of transporting oil, everyone a t Exxon should have
known this was a major league crisis w hi ch
called for the highest corpora te offi cial to
appear.
Exxon also erred in not realizing that the
public has little sympathy fo r blame-shedding . Exxo n blam ed Ca pta in Joseph J.
H azelwood, w ho it sa id may have been
drinking and not on the bridge at the time of
the accident. Exxon also criticized the Sta te
of Alaska and the Coast Guard for sna fu s in
the cleanup, and, two yea rs after the spill,
claimed that a fa ulty steering gea r may have
played a role in the grounding. But the public only views th ese as excuses. It expects
large corporations to anticipate and p repare
for human error, equipment failure, and inept governmental response. The unique
facts of a singular event, such as those w hich
surrounded the Exxon Valdez oil spill, are not
exculpatory in the court of public opinion.
They are merely the predictabl e risks for
which the corporation is held accountable.

York Times or the Washington Post. TV reporters w ill know whatever appea red in recent
press releases and wh at has been sa id that
day. They are looking fo r good visuals, pithy
statements, and controversy. For instance, if
a television reporter had confronted Alcoa in
the Massena case, the rep orte r's lea d questi on would be something like: "The attorney
general says that Alcoa dumped haza rdous
wastes d own a manhole a t th e plant more
than 2,000 times since 1985. How could that
happen?" And the Alcoa response would be
edited d own to about ten seconds in the
report aired that evening.
Second, television likes pictures. Probably
a key reason Exxon's Rawl did not rush to
Prince William Sound is that he d id not wish
to be interviewed by television reporters
with d ying sea otters and oil-soa ked beaches
in th e backgro und. But he m ight have
agreed to meet reporters in New York City
w hen the story broke, w here he would still
look chairman-like. And since the television
reporter could not have ignored an opportunity to spea k to the chairman of the board,
the corpora tion would have been able to
name the loca tion, and therefore also the
background.
Third , television coverage usually foll ows
p rint coverage. If a story appears in p rint,
there is the possibility that television news
will pick it up, but newspapers almost never
follow u p on television stories. Television
news managers rea d the morning papers,
d ecide w hat fits, and assign reporters. Print
editors eith er do not wa tch television or figure it is a d ea d story if it has alread y aired .
Fourth, the question reporters always ask
is, "How much will thi s cos t?" It is as mandatory as age at d ea th in an obituary. Be
prepared to answer.
Fifth, editorials constitute a second front.
Contrary to w ha t one would think, a newspa per's editorial d epartment is usually a .
completely separate division. These anonyAND LING ENVIRONM ENTA L mous writers will often meet with you to
matters requires a knowledge of hear your ideas fo r editorials and your views
how the media operate. It mea ns on th e subject. It is possible to sa lvage a bad
und e rs tandin g th eir d ea dlines situ ation, or improve your position, by teas(early in the d ay for television, la ter fo r ing the interest of a writer into w riting a
print), their definition of news (the hook), fa vora ble editorial. But be prepared: ed itotheir need for controversy, and their need to rial w riters are by na ture analytical, and
tell a story. Six basic rules cons ti tu tea primer good record-keepers. They w ill check facts
for dealing with the media effectively.
with your adversa ries, and they have the
First, use care in speaking with local tele- time to pull up all the clips of past articles. If
vision reporters. They are likely to know you mislea d th em they d o not fo rget, and
absolutely nothing about your issues. Un- they ca n repea tedly attack from th e high
like many print reporters, TV news reporters ground of disinterested wisd om on w hich
are not assigned beats and bring little history they sit.
to the interview . They are generalists foc usLast, tell the truth. One is constantly suring mainly on crime, wea ther, traffic, sports, prised by how little truth ever gets told .
and poli tics. Television rep orters alm ost Reporters will likely fi nd it refreshing, think
never specialize in environment or law like you are rare and specia l, and maybe even
those reporting on such matters in the New give you a break.
O

A lthough filing
a complaint
often creates
new s, the
dismissal of a
complaint is
almost never
newsw orthy.
Vindication is a
lonely business.

H
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